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Imaginary Conquests: Folktales, Film, and the Japanese 
Empire in Asia 
Richard M. Davis* 
ABSTRACT 
This article highlights three family-targeted films made under the wartime Japanese 
empire: Yamamoto Kajirō’s musical comedy Songokū (1940) and Seo Mitsuyo’s 
animated Momotarō films, Sea Eagles (1943) and Divine Warriors of the Sea (1945). 
Significantly, these films are based on two fantastical premodern stories—the Chinese 
novel Journey to the West and the Japanese Momotarō legend, respectively—whose 
quest narratives map onto Japan’s contemporaneous military expansion into 
mainland China and the islands of the South Pacific. Despite the films’ seeming 
alignment with ultranationalist ideology, I argue that the geopolitical trajectories 
of their narratives are rendered ambiguous by their various reception contexts, 
paratextual relations, spectatorial pleasures, and media modes. In the case of 
Songokū, the comedic, parodic stylings of its star, Enoken, proved an uncomfortable 
match with the already nativized Journey to the West story. This pairing generated 
a great deal of official hostility. The Momotarō films, conversely, were made with 
the explicit support of the Japanese Navy. I draw on Thomas Lamarre’s work 
to argue that the hierarchy of beings (human, animal, demon) overlaid represen-
tationally on the Japanese, the South Pacific inhabitants, and the Euro-Americans 
is undercut by the varying degrees of plasmaticity in Seo’s animated line. 
KEYWORDS Japanese film, wartime cinema, animation, film musicals, folk tales, 
Enoken 
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Introduction 
A long time ago, there lived a special man. Since birth, he had been blessed by the 
gods, and once he reached a certain age, he was given a quest. This quest would 
take him on a long journey. It would be perilous, of course, but he would not have 
to go alone. Along the way he would gather three animal companions. They would 
use their particular talents to aid him in times of trouble. After many hard miles 
and much conflict, the man would finally achieve his goal, and return home at last 
all the richer for it. 
Thus schematically sketched, we have the Ming-era Journey to the West 
(Xiyouji), one of the so-called Four Great Classic Novels in Chinese literary 
history, a deeply familiar, oft adapted story throughout East and Southeast Asia. It 
tells of the priest Tang Sanzang, based on the Tang-dynasty figure Xuanzang, who 
travels across the Asian continent to India seeking Buddhist sutras. He is joined 
first by the immortal monkey Sun Wukong, then pig-man Zhu Baijie, and finally 
Sha Wujing.1 Coincidentally, this loose quest structure also describes the well-
known Japanese folktale “Momotarō”: the story of the titular boy, found in a 
giant peach (momo), who once grown will cleanse far-off Demon’s Island of its 
monstrous inhabitants. He, too, is helped by three animals he meets along the way: 
a dog, a monkey, and a pheasant. 
That these two folktales (or indeed any two folktales) resemble one another in 
their broadest outline is no great surprise, nor did it go unremarked in Japan.2 
What makes their connection worth discussing here is the fact that film adapta-
tions of Journey to the West and Momotarō both played an important role in the film 
culture of Imperial Japan. The live-action version of the former, Songokū parts 1 
and 2 (Yamamoto 1940), and Seo Mitsuyo’s animated adaptations of the latter, 
Momotarō no umiwashi (Momotarō’s Sea Eagles, 1943) and Momotarō: Umi no 
shinpei (Momotarō’s Divine Warriors of the Sea, 1945) effectively bookended 
the Pacific War.3 Even more critically, the quest narratives in two sets of films 
explicitly parallel Japan’s efforts to conquer and colonize mainland China and the 
 
1 Chinese and Japanese names are written surname first followed by given name(s). Sha Wujing’s animal 
characteristics are ambiguous in the novel but not, as we shall see, in some later adaptations. 
2 In the introduction to 1945’s “The Tongue-Cut Sparrow,” for instance, writer Dazai Osamu describes his 
failed efforts to write an updated version of Momotarō with animal companions drawing on the more 
complex character dynamics in Journey to the West (54). On transcultural structural parallels in folklore, see 
for example Toelken, The Dynamics of Folklore (1996). 
3 Songokū is the Japanese pronunciation of Sun Wukong, aka “the monkey king.” This article treats 
Songokū as one film in two parts rather than two films. As was typical of the era, both parts were released 
simultaneously, played back-to-back, and together tell one continuous story. 
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territories of the so-called South Seas (here British Malaya and the Dutch East 
Indies), respectively. All of this is couched in kid-friendly spectacle, replete with 
funny talking animals, slapstick, and musical interludes—a far cry from the grim, 
thanophilic “popular” culture we often associate with the era. 
At once seeking to create pleasure for the mass audience and to support, 
implicitly or explicitly, the Japanese imperial project, these films invite us to 
reconsider the junction of entertainment and propaganda. In this article, I argue 
that Songokū and the Momotarō films demonstrate that the use of entertainment 
forms to further state ideology is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, enter-
tainment’s pleasures broadly conceal propaganda’s messaging, allowing it to 
recede into the background of narrative structure and character interaction and 
thus become normalized as their a priori conditions of possibility. Japan did, in 
fact, attempt a more straightforwardly didactic version of film propaganda in the 
early-mid 1930s, with “documentaries” like the notorious Hijōji Nippon (Crisis-
Time Japan, 1933) consisting of little more than patriotic harangues delivered 
in direct address by the military brass. Once it became clear, however, that these 
films were “highly unpopular with audiences,” the state turned its attention and 
resources to more conventionally entertaining genres (High 48). For instance, the 
Imperial Navy’s mega-production War at Sea: Hawai’i to Malaya (1942)—a 
battlefield spectacular explicitly celebrating the one-year anniversary of the Pearl 
Harbor attack—proved to be one of the period’s most popular films. 
On the other hand, entertainment’s pleasures are never fully contained within 
their films: they have a tendency to open for their active viewers transcultural 
linkages that may, in fact, reveal state ideology as contingent. Specifically, the 
premodern fantastical tales underpinning Songokū and the Momotarō films cast the 
geopolitical orientation(s) of the Japanese empire itself into relief. As mentioned, 
the films rewrite their source texts’ quest narratives as allegories of Japan’s ongoing 
colonial expansion. This happens somewhat indirectly in Songokū, as Sanzang’s 
holy quest to India is overlaid with signifiers of the Imperial Army’s push into 
continental China. In the Momotarō films, particularly Divine Warriors of the Sea, 
Momotarō’s forces are direct analogues of the Japanese Imperial Navy, and their 
attack on Demon’s Island makes explicit reference to earlier battles of the Pacific 
War. These films’ geographic trajectories become more complicated, however, 
when considered as mass cultural products within Japan’s heterogeneous, multi-
ethnic empire.  
This article contends that rather than simply operating along the axis of 
uneven power relations between Japan and Asia, metropole and colony, these films 
are better understood as participating in a global system of exchange—of both 
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capital and culture—that crucially includes the West, in particular the United 
States and its near-hegemonic mass media exports. This relationship, which scholars 
have visualized as an “asymmetrical totalizing triad” or an uneven “geopolitical 
incline,” has been central to the contestations of Japanese national identity since at 
least the late nineteenth century (Iwabuchi 7; Raine 9). I see both films as impli-
cated in imperial Japan’s project to “overcome modernity”—that is, the creation of 
a new sociocultural formation in which modern technologies can be bound within 
and given spiritual meaning by autochthonous, “traditional” Japanese lifeways, 
outside of the Social Darwinist teleology that insisted that Japan was always 
already behind in the global race to progress (Harootunian 34). Songokū and 
the Momotarō films represent efforts to tell premodern stories in a modern media 
framework, governed by the Japan-centric moral universe which is encapsulated 
in one of the era’s best-known slogans, “the eight corners of the world under one 
roof.”4 The implied shifts in time and space—anachronism and delocalization—
are key to the films’ ideological work as well as the potential gaps between that 
ideology and the spectatorial pleasures that surround it. 
I agree with Peter High’s contention that, due to the totalizing efforts of the 
Japanese imperial state, particularly following the escalation of censorship and 
crackdown on dissent in the early to mid-1930s, “all forms of officially sanctioned 
public activity were de facto imbricated in the totalitarian system” (xxiv). His-
torians gain little by seeking complicity or resistance in any given industrially-
produced, theatrically-released film text; this is all the more true for films made 
after the draconian Film Law of 1939. That said, however, being “imbricated in the 
totalitarian system” does not necessarily imply that a text is (state) propaganda, 
neither in the broad meaning of a deliberate “attempt to influence the public 
opinions of an audience through the transmission of ideas and values” nor in the 
common-sense meaning of a bad-faith effort to convince the public of an untruth 
in order to further state ends (Taylor 15).  
Furukawa Takahisa stresses the importance of discursive and institutional 
contexts in determining whether a given film should be classified under the 
specifically Japanese propaganda form of the kokusaku eiga (nation-building film) 
(3). If a film has been certified a “citizen’s film” by the Information Ministry, for 
example, we might reasonably assume it to be a nation-building film; if, on the 
other hand, it has been heavily censored, labeled “unfit for general audiences” and 
 
4 The phrase “eight corners of the world under one roof ” (hakkō ichiu) comes from a text attributed to 
seventh-century B.C.E. Emperor Jimmu, the mythological founder of Japan. As used by the ultranationalists, 
hakkō ichiu became shorthand for Japan’s transhistorical destiny to encompass the entire world under its 
divinely-mandated rule. 
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snubbed by mainstream film critics, it is unlikely to be a nation-building film—
regardless of its ostensible ideological content. This proves to be one of the chief 
distinctions between Songokū and the Momotarō films: the former was excoriated 
in the press, whereas the latter were directly sponsored by the Imperial Japanese 
Navy. Despite seeming parallels in the films’ narratives, affects, and geopolitical 
orientations, any analysis must weigh their similarities against the stark differences 
in their production and reception contexts. That said, my analysis here differs from 
Furukawa’s in that I do take the films’ formal and affective registers to be key 
components of any ideological critique mounted against them. 
A second major distinction involves the two films’ “material orientations” 
(Lamarre 111). On the one hand, Songokū is a live-action film, in which premodern, 
exotic, and fantastical elements are represented through mise-en-scène (primarily 
décor and costuming) and special effects (masking, trick cuts, fast/slow motion, 
etc.). Divine Warriors, on the other hand, is fully animated, which has significant 
implications. For one, its premodern, exotic, and fantastical elements occupy the 
same ontological grounds as its contemporary, “realistic” elements;5 in animation 
there is no meaningful distinction between the filmic and the profilmic, and 
so there is never friction between photographic verisimilitude and the representa-
tional devices that supplement it. This suggests a deep affinity underlying the 
historical relationship between animation and speculative fiction, one that holds 
as true in Japan—where folk themes have inspired many animated films, starting 
at least as early as 1917—as in the rest of the world (Lopez 582). Conversely, 
the fantastical elements of Songokū are inflected most heavily by one particular 
paratext: that of its star, Enomoto Ken’ichi (Enoken), his film output through the 
1930s, and his uniquely vexed relationship with the imperial Japanese state and its 
advocates in the media. 
One final point of contrast needs to be drawn, namely, the tremendously 
altered material, social, legal, and psychological circumstances in Japan between 
Songokū’s November 1940 release and Divine Warrior in April 1945. It is well 
beyond the scope of this article to detail the tumultuous years of the Pacific War, 
but we might note that Songokū precedes the attack on Pearl Harbor by some 
thirteen months, whereas Divine Warriors came out less than four months before 
the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. By 1940 Japan had been at war with China for 
upwards of nine years; “total war” was declared in 1937 following the Marco Polo 
Bridge Incident, and along with it a “total mobilization” of Japanese society for the 
war effort. That said, the Japanese empire of 1940 was essentially limited to Korea, 
 
5 With the notable exception of the historical shadow play, which we will discuss in detail. 
Ex-position 
December 
2019 
 
10 
Taiwan, “Manchukuo,” and wide (though hotly contested) swaths of coastal China. 
By 1945 Japan had conquered almost the entirety of Southeast Asia; it had 
subsequently been driven out of or neutralized in much of that territory, though 
of course Japanese citizens were not directly apprised of these losses. In May 1945, 
a month before Divine Warriors was released, Allied bombers burned Tokyo to the 
ground, resulting in some 100,000 civilian deaths. Needless to say, the populace 
did not have to be told that the war was going badly. 
The remaining sections of this article detail the reception contexts and material 
orientations of Songokū and the Momotarō films, juxtaposed with close readings of 
their ideological and pleasurable textual effects. The first discusses the two 
primary “source texts” of Songokū: the novel Journey to the West and lead actor 
Enoken’s star image. Within the context of fraught debates over the course of 
Japanese modernity in the 1930s, I see Enoken’s parodic goals as participating 
in the much longer process by which Journey to the West was ahistoricized and 
nativized as Japanese. The second section turns to the Songokū film itself, examin-
ing the way in which relationships between image, music, and paratext further 
dislocate Journey to the West, ambiguously inscribing its place in the “asymmetrical 
totalizing triad” between Japan, China, and the US. In the third section, I analyze 
different modes of ethnic representation in the Momotarō films by contrasting 
animality with the malleability of the animated line. Finally, I return to the 
overarching quest narratives in the films and the pressure they put on Japan’s 
geopolitical orientation. 
Enoken and the Contested Japanese Modern 
If we are to believe certain postwar accounts, the film thus far called Songokū has a 
longer title: Enoken no Songokū (Enoken’s Songokū). Enoken, the comedian who 
plays the monkey king, is the film’s top-billed star. As the head of his own theater 
troupe and frequent collaborator with director Yamamoto Kajirō, he was one of 
the creative intelligences behind it as well. In the 1930s, Enoken’s name appeared 
on twenty-seven films by Toho, and its predecessor P. C. L. Enoken was in fact 
Toho Studio’s prime earner in these years; according to Studio Head Mori Iwao, 
he was nothing short of “box office gold” (Izaki 136). It makes sense that his name 
would be attached to Songokū as well, a fact borne out by Toho Studio’s official 
1986 VHS release of Enoken no Songokū, thus far the only home video version 
available commercially. 
This postwar title, however, is at odds with the historical record. Despite 
Enoken’s prominent role, and despite the long precedent of “Enoken” films, 
Folktales, Film, 
and the Japanese 
Empire in Asia 
 
11 
Songokū did not bear his name in 1940, a fact borne out by both the extant film 
print and contemporaneous advertising materials.6 Though perhaps a minor 
historical discrepancy, the questions it raises—why was the name “changed” in the 
postwar? why wasn’t it “Enoken’s” to begin with?—help shed light on the film’s 
reception context and how that informs the ideological work, both actual and 
attempted. I take the Enoken star image to be key to understanding Songokū’s 
complex intersections of fantasy and reality, the premodern and modernity, and 
Japan, China, and the West.7 The fact is, the name “Enoken” itself had become 
politically suspect by 1940. Not only was it a contraction of the honest Japanese 
name Enomoto Ken’ichi, but it was written in the katakana syllabary, the same 
used for foreign loan words. In the late 1930s, a wave of nationalist xenophobia 
swept up jazz singer Dick Miné, comic actor Fujiwara Kamatari, and a host of 
others who were forced under threat of official censure to abandon the “disrespect-
ful vocabulary” of their stage names and to revert to their birth names (Yamaguchi 
and Fujiwara 98). Perhaps in 1940, he and Toho recognized that Songokū was 
simply too commercially important to run the risk of nationalist interference and 
so left his name off the marquee. After 1941 “Enoken” would disappear entirely; 
he was exclusively credited as “Enomoto Ken’ichi” again, at least until after the war 
had ended. 
The Enoken star image, moreover, was a deeply vexed one for the nationalist 
ideologues of the late 1930s. Having first risen to prominence in the “Asakusa 
Opera” scene in the 1920s, Enoken and his theatrical company—variously named 
Casino Follies, Pierre Brilliant, and Enoken Ichiza—specialized in an irreverent, 
parodic mode of comedy theater, one that blended slapstick, wordplay, popular 
songs (often with altered lyrics), erotic innuendo, and above all a kind of manic, 
self-consciously modern energy. 8  Starting in 1934, with Enoken no seishun 
suikoden (Enoken’s Youth Suikoden, Yamamoto), this same energy would prove a 
big hit with the broader movie-going audience as well. Youth Suikoden is a college 
comedy, but Enoken’s jidaigeki (period film) offerings like Enoken no Kondō Isami 
and Enoken no Chakkiri Kinta would prove his biggest hits of the interwar years. 
 
6 The National Film Archive of Japan holds three of the original release prints. Examples of contemporaneous 
advertisements can be found in Asahi Shimbun 24 Oct. 1940: 4; and Asahi Shimbun 31 Oct. 1940: 8. 
7 In Richard Dyer’s usage, a “star image” refers not to historical actor but to the discursive text constructed 
around them out of various media materials, including but not limited to the films they appear in (2-7). 
8 Future Nobel Prize-winner Kawabata Yasunari inadvertently made the Casino Follies famous when he 
name-dropped them in his 1929 serialized novel The Scarlet Gang of Asakusa. On the Follies and the Asakusa 
scene more generally he writes: “Everything is flung out in the raw. Desires dance naked. All races, all classes, 
all jumbled together forming a bottomless, endless current, flowing day and night, no beginning, no end. 
Asakusa is alive. . . . Eroticism and nonsense and speed and comic-strip humor of current events, jazz songs 
and ladies’ legs . . .” (30-31; second ellipsis in orig.). 
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Within a production system largely segregated along the lines of period and 
contemporary settings, Enoken was the rare performer to successfully straddle 
both worlds. 
The problem with Enoken was thus twofold. In films set in the present day, he 
merely represented a prominent example of what ideologues saw as Japan’s 
“corruption” by the enticements of Western modernity and mass culture: its 
amoral focus on individualism and sensuality. When mainstream critics upbraided 
his films as the “dregs” of Hollywood entertainment, they called attention not only 
to their perceived lack of quality but also to their status as a secondhand imitation 
of an already suspect form (Murakami 107). Enoken’s films set in the premodern 
past effectively added insult to injury. While ideologues like film critic Tsumura 
Hideo were calling for “history films” to ground the “fairy tale” quality of con-
temporaneous period films in a more reverential “realism,” Enoken persisted in 
injecting his own modern hijinks into the Japanese past itself, often burlesquing 
venerated textbook figures like Kondō Isami and Sakamoto Ryōma (High 228). 
Put another way, one of the chief ideological functions of Japanese period films is 
to instantiate an “absolute point of historical disjunction,” an irrevocably lost before 
posited as antithesis to the morally compromised now (Yoshimoto 210). Enoken’s 
films troubled this distinction. 
Journey to the West, then, must have represented an appealing third path for 
both Enoken and the profitable sub-industry surrounding him at Toho, including 
producer Takimura Kazuo and studio head Mori Iwao. Here was a story that would 
allow him to indulge in his usual anachronistic gags, but set at a safe remove from 
the sacrosanct Japanese past; moreover, its particular story—a band of travelers 
journey ever deeper into continental Asia in order to fulfill a sacred quest—was 
one that mirrored the trajectory and ideological justifications for imperial Japan’s 
ongoing war of conquest in China. By turning Journey to the West into an Enoken 
musical comedy (sans the troubling “Enoken” in the title), the producers were 
hoping for a broad appeal: both to the mass audience which was already fond of 
Enoken’s films and to the critics, educators, and other cultural gatekeepers who 
were not.  
From a box-office perspective, this gamble paid off. Songokū was a huge success, 
probably the biggest hit of Enoken’s career. On its debut, November 10, the Tokyo 
Nichigeki Theater reported its largest ever single day attendance: more than 
20,000 tickets sold. The following day, it broke the Nichigeki’s record again, and 
would unsurprisingly go on to be one of Toho’s top earners for the year (Furukawa 
148). Conversely, the response from Japanese officialdom was decidedly less 
enthusiastic. It is true that the film was not censored, nor was it labeled “unfit for 
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general audiences” (children under the age of fifteen), making it one of Enoken’s 
few general releases of the era; however, where critics deigned to review the film 
at all, they were scathing. Asahi Shimbun critic Q (the aforementioned Tsumura 
Hideo), probably the best-known film reviewer of his day, called Songokū an 
“idiotic, mirthless comedy,” an “epic of stupidity,” and argued that “the head of 
production, Mori [Iwao], should be held accountable for this insult to the Japanese 
film world” (5). 
Ironically, some of Q’s vitriol may have been bound up in his ethnonationalist 
feelings about the sanctity of Journey to the West itself. This is ironic, of course, 
because Journey to the West is a deeply Chinese text, a classic Ming Dynasty novel 
that tells a fantastical version of events that transpired in the Tang Dynasty roughly 
800 years earlier. But in another sense 1940’s Songokū is just another step (or, 
for Q, misstep) in the long historical process by which Journey to the West was 
nativized and domesticated as, essentially, Japanese. If one goal of the Japanese 
nationalists was to “overcome [Western] modernity,” we might think of this as a 
parallel, though much earlier, effort to overcome Sinocentrism: again, by selec-
tively taking desired elements—in this case cultural, not technological—and first 
adapting them to, then containing them within, local sociopolitical formations. 
For just one example of this process, consider the third of Tang Sanzang’s 
disciples, Sha Wujing, sometimes called “Sandy” in English translations. In Journey 
to the West, Sha Wujing is first encountered as a malevolent water demon haunting 
the Flowing Sands River, with “A head full of tousled and flame-like hair / A pair 
of bright, round eyes which shone like lamps / An indigo face, neither black nor 
green / An old dragon’s voice like thunderclap or drum” (Wu 422). Despite this 
visual description, however, to the Japanese a “water demon” would doubtless have 
conjured the very clear image of a kappa—a folkloric water monster, vaguely 
turtle-looking, with a flat dish-like head. Indeed, depictions of Sha Wujing as a 
kappa go back at least to Bakin Kyokutei’s “partial adaptation” Konpira-bune Rishō 
no Tomozuna, from circa 1830 (3). A century later, this cultural transposition was 
firmly etched in the Japanese popular imagination: Songokū’s Sha Wujing, played 
by Kanai Toshio, is a kappa as well. 
Songokū is thus neither simply a (frivolous) literary adaptation, nor simply 
another Enoken star vehicle. It stands at a curious junction of these two paratexts: 
at once classical and popular, historical and contemporary, Japanese and Chinese. 
To be sure, part of its appeal for Enoken and Toho was its remove from the 
Japanese home islands; that Enoken’s Sun Wukong could follow the footsteps of 
the Imperial Army westward across the Asian continent was, doubtless, a bit of an 
ideological shield against criticism. As we move from paratext to text in the next 
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section, this apparently linear trajectory will grow more geopolitically complex. 
The Sonic Geographies of Songoku 
One thing Songokū shares with all the named Enoken films is its privileging of 
spectacle over narrative. By drawing on the extremely familiar Journey to the West 
story, Songokū has a ready-made structure on which to string its sensational 
elements: musical numbers, special effects, slapstick comedy, and action scenes. 
In this section, I emphasize the first two of these elements as points of potential 
rupture: places where the straightforward quest narrative is complicated or even 
undercut by spectatorial pleasure and play. Looking at Songokū’s musical numbers 
and special effects, we find that the film text’s admixture of Japanese, Chinese, 
“Asian,” and finally American cultural signifiers belies any simple reading of the 
movie as appropriative Orientalism. Songokū reveals a rather more nuanced 
relationship to the uneven geopolitical forces that mold it and its audiences. 
That said, Songokū’s very first scene in the court of Emperor Xuanzong seems 
to promise a rampantly Orientalist perspective. Following a deep drum blast, the 
scene opens on a close-up of a Chinese lion statue atop an urn, with the Emperor 
in the background; the camera then cranes up to a Busby Berkeley-esque geo-
metrical configuration of dancers from high angle. The camera pulls back to a long 
shot showing us the entire court in dizzying motion—framed by two dark-skinned, 
turbaned palace guards—and finally cuts in again to the chief dancer, fans in hand 
and long sleeves flowing. This entire scene, which lasts for several minutes, sets up 
one of the film’s most basic appeals: the spectacle of the exoticized continental 
other—coded often as a young, attractive, virginal woman—made available for 
voyeuristic consumption. A similar moment occurs later when the companions 
join a group of handmaidens at a desert oasis for a frenzied dance to the tune of 
“The Streets of Cairo, or the Poor Little Country Maid,” a.k.a. the “Snake 
Charmer’s Song”—doubtless the greatest sonic cliché of Orientalism in modern 
times. Here, the erotic spectacle is a double-edged sword, though. Not only does 
it bear the promise of sexual liaisons in wait, but in this case, it is also a trap; the 
handmaidens’ queen has conspired to capture Tang Sanzang while his disciples are 
distracted. The Orientalized continent may be ripe for adventure, but its people 
are scarcely trustworthy. According to one intertitle, the biggest threats on the 
journey include “tigers, giant snakes, and bandits (zoku),” the last of which was the 
ubiquitous word used for anti-Japanese guerrillas by the press (High 33). 
This is one of many ways Songokū overlays its fantastical/historical setting with 
contemporary markers of imperial expansion and mechanized warfare. Perhaps 
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the most dramatic update to Journey to the West is Songokū’s replacement of the 
monkey king’s magic with industrial technologies: whereas in the Chinese original 
Sun Wukong can leap ten-thousand leagues through the clouds, here he simply 
transforms his iron staff into a Zero-type fighter plane, complete with monkey 
decal. Later, when outnumbered by the King of Monsters’ evil retinue, he 
transforms his staff again into a machine gun, which he then uses to mow down 
bad guys by the dozen. It is worth remembering that this “magic,” like the monk’s 
divine quest, is blessed by Kannon (Guanyin) herself. Although Tang Sanzang will 
scold Sun Wukong for his violent ways, that violence is nevertheless coded as 
righteous within the film’s moral economy. After all, who but demons would 
oppose a holy quest? 
As a Toho production, Songokū features almost entirely Japanese actors, 
speaking almost exclusively Japanese. There are, however, a few prominent excep-
tions, none more glaring than the performance by the so-called Shina Ningyō 
(“China Doll”). Played by actress Wang Yang (on loan from the China Film Com-
pany, a majority Japanese-owned production house in Shanghai), she behaves 
much like the doll in a music box: wind her up and she sings and dances jerkily on 
the spot. Her song is in Mandarin and is not subtitled in the Japanese release; 
home island audiences would have presumably picked up on little to none of its 
semantic content. It would instead have served as a spectacle of pure difference, a 
beautiful young woman being physically forced to sing for our amusement—and 
doing so with a smile. 
Wang Yang is not the only “Chinese” actress in Songokū. Alongside Enoken and 
Takamine Hideko, the film’s top-billed performer is Ri Kōran (Li Xianglan). A 
rather infamous figure, Ri was born Yamaguchi Yoshiko to a family of Japanese 
settlers in Fushun, and due to her near-native bilingual abilities and classically-
trained singing voice, she became something of the “Chinese” face of Japanese 
empire.9 In Songokū, however, her veiled “desert princess” character sings Japanese 
in a bluesy mode that contemporary audiences would have identified with jazu 
(jazz), imported from the US and quickly nativized. The signifiers here are almost 
too many to unpack: Japan’s leading icon of “Chinese” femininity, veiled and 
surrounded by Moorish architecture, singing American blues in Japanese. Even 
more so than Wang Yang, Ri’s ambiguous otherness yields up her face, voice, and 
 
9 Earlier the same year, Ri starred in China Nights (Fushimizu), in which she plays a Chinese woman whose 
anti-Japanese sentiments are conquered by the love of—and, notoriously, a slap from—a “good” Japanese 
man, played by matinee icon Hasegawa Kazuo. This would prove one of the biggest hits of the wartime era; 
Ri became an overnight sensation. At her peak, in February 1941, more than 100,000 people turned up at 
the Tokyo Nichigeki Theater to see her solo act (High 275). 
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body as sites for transnational and transhistorical spectatorial pleasures.  
There are many scenes like this in Songokū, when Euro-American intertexts 
momentarily rupture the spatial continuity of Japan-in-Continental-Asia. Most are 
even more pronounced, popular Western songs closely translated into Japanese—a 
practice known as kaeuta, or “altered song,” very popular in the 20s and 30s. In one 
early scene, when Zhu Bajie is still trying to hide his porcine nature, he accidently 
slips from a love ballad into the chorus of “Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf ?”. 
When the disciples are riding on Songoku’s magical warplane, they sing a slightly 
modified version of “The Man on the Flying Trapeze.” Later, when the Golden and 
Silver Horned Kings dose them with “Opera Gas,” they perform a medley of 
highlights from Rigoletto, The Merry Widow, Carmen, La Traviata, Faust, and many 
others, on a diegetic stage decked out like a nineteenth-century European town. 
That this stage is located in the Horned Kings’ underground robot factory, itself 
filmed in the otherworldly geometrical spaces of the Oya Quarry in Tochigi, only 
highlights the many layers of decontextualization and delocalization at work here. 
An even more provocative juxtaposition comes when the companions make 
camp in what turns out to be a magical forest. The audience discovers this after 
the travelers have gone to sleep; ominous drums sound over a close-up of their 
campfire dwindling to nothing, a trick of reverse photography. We then see a scene 
of large toadstools in the woods. The mushrooms begin to yawn, and a quick 
dissolve transforms them into women in vaguely toadstool-shaped hats, Dutch 
caps with triangular wings. The sound of their yawning meanwhile modulates into 
the melody of “When You Wish upon a Star,” the Pinocchio (1940) theme song; 
they sing and dance about the pleasures of singing and dancing in the forest at 
night, all from a static extreme-long shot. When Sun Wukong wakes in fright, they 
retract back into their toadstools. A little later in the sequence—following an 
encounter with a witch named “Anata” (“You”), her prosthetic nose very reminis-
cent of the Wizard of Oz (1939)—the companions are taken to a group of dwarf 
shoemakers (actually children in fake beards). Naturally their kaeuta derives from 
Snow White’s “Heigh Ho” (1937), with lyrics like “The woods at night echo with 
the sounds of hammers.” Those hammers have taken over from the pickaxes in the 
original as the percussion instrument driving the song’s rhythm. 
Due first to restrictions and then ultimately the ban on foreign film exhibition, 
however, Japanese audiences saw neither Snow White nor Pinocchio (nor, for that 
matter, The Wizard of Oz) until well into the postwar, despite their global acclaim 
and the public’s “many loud calls” for a domestic release (“Aki made oazuke”). The 
songs thus preceded the films in Japan—Snow White was the first film whose 
soundtrack was made commercially available, on the Victor label—and it is likely 
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that Enoken, Yamamoto, and/or composer Suzuki Seiichi were able to privately 
screen the films through Toho Studio, which like all film studios was allowed to 
keep otherwise banned foreign films for competitive purposes.10 Used as kaeuta 
in Songokū, however, these songs reveal the gulf between what the audience 
wanted to see and what they were allowed to see, between the Technicolor feature-
length full-animated cartoons being made in the US, and the rather modest and 
indifferently staged black-and-white live action versions that were made—that 
could be made—in Japan. The Disney songs resist the colonizing impulse that 
dominates both Chinese songs and cultural markers more generally in Songokū; 
they come from the other end of the geopolitical incline, and whatever pleasure 
they offered was surely offset by that awareness among the bulk of their audience.  
Momotaro and the Disciplined Animated Body 
Songokū was hardly unique among Japanese films of its era in drawing on elements 
from Walt Disney productions. In the early 1930s, there was an absolute flood of 
American animation into Japan, starting with Mickey Mouse in Steamboat Willie 
(1931) and continuing with his competitors like Popeye, Felix the Cat, and Betty 
Boop. These animated shorts, a regular component of film programs, would prove 
hugely popular, so much so that Japanese comics (manga) and animation began 
drawing inspiration from or just directly copying Mickey’s look (Ōtsuka 255).11 
By the mid-1930s Japanese animation was in full swing, producing dozens of short 
films featuring homegrown characters like Norakuro and Dankichi. Although 
precise exhibition figures are hard to come by, the mass culture of the era is full of 
references to both Japanese and American animation, suggesting that they both 
had a roughly equivalent cultural impact, even if not necessarily shown in equal 
proportions.12 
 
10 Alternatively, they may have seen the films while doing location shooting in China, or possibly while on a 
goodwill performance tour there. 
11 Film programs were a standard exhibition practice through much of the twentieth-century that consisted of 
a bundle of shorter and longer films available for a single price. Typical film programs would include an 
animated short, a newsreel, a short serial, a feature film, and a second B-picture as well. 
12 Broadly speaking, film theaters in Japan were separated into two categories: those that showed Japanese films 
(hōga) and those that showed foreign, almost exclusively Western, films (yōga). The former outnumbered 
the latter by roughly two-to-one, though starting in 1938 this ratio would rise precipitously as various 
cultural and legal pressures kept foreign films out of the country and off the screens. Further, foreign movie 
theaters tended to be clustered in the big cities and attracted a more educated, middle-class clientele—even 
if, as Furukawa Takahisa suggests, some of those in the audience may have been “eating their cultural 
vegetables” while (secretly) preferring Japanese movies (20-21). That said, more archival research is needed 
to determine whether Japanese and foreign movie theaters exclusively showed animated shorts from their 
respective zones, or if they were mixed together. 
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Between the years 1938 and 1941, however, American film imports would 
be first limited, then halted altogether at the outset of the Pacific War. Alongside 
the expected cultural-nationalist motivation to curtail pernicious foreign influence, 
there was an economic reason for this shift: the government was strongly con-
cerned about an import-export imbalance that resulted in several million yen 
being “leached” from the country each year (High 82). Regardless of reason, more 
and more stringent censorship regimes, particularly following the Nazi-inspired 
1939 Film Law, resulted in fewer and fewer American films judged fit for public 
consumption. Walt Disney’s—and indeed the world’s—first fully-animated 
feature-length color film, Snow White (1937), appears to have been an early 
casualty of these policies. Although there is no single glaring ideological problem 
with the film, one suspects that it was precisely Snow White’s technological 
triumphs that led to its ban.13 In terms of the sophistication and complexity of its 
animation, the film was so far ahead of its global competitors as to virtually 
constitute a new medium. 
Despite Snow White’s notable absence from the Japanese home islands, the 
Japanese film industry certainly took note of its phenomenal worldwide success. 
Not only was there potentially a lot of money to be made by producing a domestic 
animated feature, but, as Michael Baskett notes, by the late 1930s animation itself 
had become a serious topic in critical discourse, with intellectuals and government 
officials alike seeking to harness the power of these “modern myths” for national-
istic ends (50). Ultimately, it would take a collaboration between animation studio 
Geijutsu Eigasha and the Imperial Japanese Navy—in fierce competition with the 
Imperial Army for recruits—to realize something like nativized competition for 
Disney’s Snow White, not to mention its follow-ups Pinocchio (1940), Fantasia 
(1940), Dumbo (1941), and Bambi (1942). These were the two Momotarō films 
directed by Seo Mitsuyo, which were released in 1943 and 1945 after three-plus 
years in production. Postwar accounts often focus on the latter, Momotarō’s Divine 
Warriors of the Sea, as Japan’s first feature-length animated film, while neglecting 
the earlier and shorter Momotarō’s Sea Eagles. However, this emphasis on length—
74 versus 36 minutes—ignores the strong stylistic and thematic continuities be-
tween the two films, which I examine as paired texts. 
In their basic form, both Momotarō films recast the Edo period Momotarō 
folktale(s) into the present day. Momotarō is now a naval commander; the three 
animal companions of the original—dog, monkey, and pheasant—now constitute 
 
13 A similar dynamic surrounded the lack of Japanese sound film production in the years 1927-1932, when the 
film industry and its critics generated a panicked discourse about the country’s technological “belatedness.” 
For more, see Davis, “Whose Blue Heaven?” (2017). 
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the semi-anthropomorphized crew of his air- and seacraft, alongside new additions 
like bears and especially rabbits, who are largely consigned to non-combat roles. 
Momotarō himself is the only figure in either film who codes as strictly human; 
his American and British opponents, folkloric demons (oni) in the original, are 
portrayed as human-like but with conventional demon horns and abjectly rubbery 
limbs—a point to which we will return momentarily. Finally, the original’s story 
of the cleansing of Demon Island (Onigashima) is mapped in the two films 
onto two very different phases of the Pacific War. In Sea Eagles, Demon Island 
is explicitly figured as Pearl Harbor, with the film recasting the Japanese surprise 
attack of December 7, 1941 in a comical mode.14 In Divine Warriors, Demon 
Island is a fictional location shown to be somewhere in the Indonesian archipelago 
(the Dutch East Indies prior to the Japanese conquest), though representationally 
it is a composite of signifiers for the “South Seas,” including Australia (kangaroos) 
and Singapore (Percival’s 1942 surrender to Yamashita). 
Before going too far into the films’ representational content, it is worth bearing 
in mind Thomas Lamarre’s call for scholars of wartime animation (and beyond) 
to interrogate the “materiality of the medium” over its “politics of representation,” 
arguing that the latter fails to account for the instability of animated representa-
tions and their “actual experience and impact” on the audience (110). Lamarre 
emphasizes the fluidity and deformability of the line in character animation as it 
developed in America in the 1930s and was subsequently taken up in Japan. Sergei 
Eisenstein famously termed this quality the “plasmatic”: animation’s ever-
changing forms, the infinite wellspring of life they imply, and the revolutionary 
potential they suggest in breaking the static, fixed, and seemingly timeless (10). 
Lamarre ties the plasmatic (a.k.a. plastic) to animation’s affinity for “nonhuman, 
humanoid, or animaloid characters”: 
The force of the moving image is thus directed into [these characters] whose 
plasticity embodies that force, at once folding it into their bodies and releasing 
it. Needless to say, this is not a matter of representation. Plasticity does not 
represent the force of the mechanical succession of images. It affords an actual 
experience of it. The animal or animaloid characters summon and channel a 
technical force. As a consequence, a technical force is now experienced as an 
animal force, as vitality, as life itself. (114) 
 
14 Its release was preceded some four months earlier by the aforementioned War at Sea: Hawaii to Malaya 
(1942). Not only was War at Sea also sponsored by the Imperial Navy, but it was directed by Yamamoto 
Kajirō, director of Songokū and Enoken’s long-term collaborator. 
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Differences in degree of plasticity/plasmaticness underline Momotarō’s hierarchy 
of beings, with Momotarō himself simultaneously the most human and the least 
flexible, his outline solid, corporeal, and largely unchanging. His Japanese-animal 
underlings closely follow his example, with relatively little of the squash-and-
stretch malleability that we see in, for instance, animal characters in the Disney 
shorts. Even when their animal characteristics are used for physical gags—for 
instance, an early moment in Sea Eagles when a rabbit performs semaphore with 
its long ears—their overall form is still largely maintained.  
On the opposite end of the spectrum we find Momotarō and company’s 
monstrous antagonists: the Americans at Pearl Harbor and the British in the South 
Seas. As mentioned, they are at once more recognizably human (i.e., not animalistic) 
than their Japanese counterparts, while also being clearly coded as “demons” via 
their horns. More than this, though, their bodies are profoundly plasmatic, given 
to abject deformation. This manifests somewhat differently in the two Momotarō 
films. In Sea Eagles, the Americans are largely portrayed as squat, bulbous figures, 
interchangeable except for one particularly blubbering, cowardly man whose 
appearance is unmistakably that of Bluto from the Popeye animated series, albeit a 
Bluto who is more fat than muscle. His tiny head sits atop a grotesquely long neck 
that can stretch out as far as either of his arms. When, in the middle of the assault, 
he pulls a beer out of his shirt and chugs it—a mocking riff on Popeye’s spinach 
can—his throat pulses out like a snake eating an egg.15 
By comparison, the British troops in Divine Warriors are spindly, rubbery 
things, their limbs seemingly boneless, constantly flapping around. Their faces, too, 
have a kind of sketchy quality that changes greatly from frame to frame. They give 
off the air of having been drawn by children. This is deliberate, of course, and has 
its greatest visual payoff in climactic scene of surrender, one explicitly modeled on 
General Percival’s surrendering of Singapore to General Yamashita on January 15, 
1942—a deeply iconic moment in the Japanese film culture of the day (High 367). 
Here we are presented with Momotarō and his retinue on one side of the negotia-
tion table—calm and largely unmoving—set against the abject British/Demons 
on the other, who twitch nervously, fiddle their thumbs, stutter, and scrunch 
their rubbery faces in anxiety. Their efforts to stall and dissemble are ultimately 
unsuccessful, betrayed by their undisciplined bodies. The hierarchies of power and 
humanity are both amply clear.  
 
15 Earlier, one of the monkey airmen enacts the same Popeye ritual of eating for strength. Here, though, he 
overwrites the American original by eating a kibidango (millet dumpling)—Momotarō’s “payment” to his 
animal companions in the original folktale. 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, the death and destruction of these cowardly, dehu-
manized American and British forces is treated in the Momotarō films as both 
laudable and, often, comic. American seamen drown en masse in Sea Eagles, 
spilling out of a lifeboat like so many clowns out of a clown car—naturally, they 
try to flee rather than mount a defense. In Divine Warriors, our very first view of a 
British soldier is an extreme close-up on his screaming mouth as he’s tumbled out 
of a tank by a Japanese ambush; two quick cuts later, we see him graphically 
(though bloodlessly) bayonetted in the chest. In fact, this is a rather striking 
departure from the Japanese representational norm through most of the era: even 
in war movies, we rarely get a direct depiction of opposition forces. They tend to 
be off-screen or at most shown obliquely—silhouetted masses at night, say. Yet in 
the Momotarō films they are hyper-visible, rendered in extreme close-ups, in all 
their abject embodiment. Lamarre notes that “the elasticity associated with 
animated characters imparts a sense of their invulnerability and even immortality: 
they appear resilient and resistant to injury and death” (80). Paradoxically, this 
renders the animated enemy’s on-screen destruction more palatable, something 
less than bodily annihilation, simply one more deformation among many. 
In between the two opposing camps of Japanese and Euro-Americans we find 
a third major representational category: the peoples of the South Seas, Japan’s 
“native” colonial subjects. Absent from Sea Eagles, these South Seas inhabitants 
figure prominently in Divine Warriors, especially in the film’s long second act when 
the Naval Construction Brigade is tasked with building an airfield from which to 
strike Demon Island. Here, they find a whole menagerie of indigenous animals—
rhinos, hornbills, elephants, crocodiles, kangaroos, etc.—depicted in a maximally 
bestial fashion, with few human characteristics. One exception is a trio of Asiatic 
monkey species, including a Proboscis Monkey, who are shown as visually dissimilar 
from the humanly-proportioned Japanese macaques. With a single article of 
clothing each—the songkok cap common to Muslim males of the archipelago—
and seemingly the only animals capable of native speech, they greet the arrival of 
Momotarō and his air force by singing, “They look a tiny bit like us . . . but just a 
tiny bit.” The suggestion, of course, is of similarity with hierarchical difference, 
precisely the underpinnings of pan-Asian ideology in the Japanese empire. The 
Japanese imperial project entices the other animals to “spontaneously” chip in 
to build the airfield: the tigers chop down trees; the rhinos pull up stumps; the 
squirrels hammer together the buildings. This sequence is similarly set to a song, 
although significantly not one that comes from the animal laborers themselves; 
sung in parts by a children’s choir, it seems rather to drift above them, ethereal. 
The lyrics speak of the “joy” of work and the “strength” inspired by Japan’s example. 
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Being animals, their natural state is one of physical exertion. There is no hint that 
they might be human subjects with desires beyond this instrumental role. 
But the colonial project is not content to merely exploit these animals’ labor. It 
requires interpellating them as well, forcing them to internalize the codes of 
the metropole via language. So, once the building is done, the animals must be 
gathered into an open-air classroom and taught the basic Japanese katakana 
syllabary. The dog-sailor-teacher begins by having the students repeat after him, 
and they do so adequately, but when it is time for them to actually match the sound 
to its syllable, they can only respond in their native, bestial cry or squawk or howl. 
Further, like unruly children they quickly lose interest and start wandering away 
from their desks, pranking one another. Only when another sailor pulls out a 
harmonica and starts playing the Japanese equivalent of “The Alphabet Song” do 
the South Sea animals first pick up on the rhythm (tapping hooves, swaying) and 
then the melody and words. Then when they have mastered the song, it resolves 
into a full-on musical number as the animals now perform domestic—rather than 
brute—labor for the Japanese, like doing laundry and preparing food. Interestingly, 
this quasi-civilizing transformation is carried out via what Rick Altman calls an 
“audio dissolve,” a transitional passage between the diegetic and music tracks in 
the integrated musical film (63). Here, though, the audio dissolve does not 
smooth over the ontological break between “realistic” and musical passages, but 
rather between the different civilizational levels of the native animals. This 
suggests something of the ideological difficulties involved in incorporating the 
peoples of the southern Pacific into the Japanese imaginary. 
Divine Warriors further distinguishes its imperial project in opposition to that 
of the European colonialists who conquered Demon Island in the distant past.16 
Here, on the morning of the Japanese assault, the film unexpectedly breaks into a 
different media mode: a kind of limited animation mimicking the Balinese puppet 
theater. Character and object layers are done in flat silhouette; they move in a jerky 
fashion, as though hinged at the joints, and mostly along the horizontal plane. 
Rigid, they display none of the plasmaticity of the animated characters elsewhere. 
A voice-over narrator, unheard elsewhere in the film, recounts a tale of European 
merchants—pirates, in fact—who arrived long ago in their “black ships.”17 In 
 
16 Conversely, Sea Eagles neglects to touch on the colonial legacy of Hawaii. Though it plays “Aloha ‘Oe” in the 
build-up to the Pearl Harbor attack, it uses it as a sonic cliché of “Hawaiianness”; the song’s author, Hawaii’s 
last deposed monarch, Lili’uokalani, would seem to suggest another anticolonial Pan-Asian linkage. That 
said, the spectacularly destructive attack in Sea Eagles is clearly not intended for anyone’s liberation. 
17 The same sobriquet is associated with Admiral Perry’s fleet, which forcefully “opened” Japan to American 
and subsequently European trade starting in 1857. The historical link between these two Western incursions 
is thus made explicit to the Japanese-speaking audience. 
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short succession the pirates tell perfumed lies to the native king, betray their 
promises, and wage war on his “gentle” subjects. The natives lose to the European 
canons, but the scene closes on a prophecy: a mystical obelisk, deep in the jungle, 
that promises the island’s freedom will only be restored through the intervention 
of a “kingdom of angels” from the far north. Then a fade takes us back to the 
present day, and Japanese airmen in rows on the morning of the assault, their 
scarves flapping nobly in the dawn breeze. Though fully animated, they are, for the 
moment, visible simply as silhouettes. 
So Divine Warriors comes full circle, inventing a South Seas folk legend that has 
effectively summoned a Japanese folk hero. By toggling between limited and full 
animation, the film can mark a distinction between the historical sins of the 
European powers and the current “liberatory” efforts of the Japanese, while also 
visually embedding the Japanese airmen within a mythic, transhistorical, Pan-Asian 
lineage. As we have seen, both Momotarō films use media modes to establish a clear 
hierarchy of beings, with the most human-like and most disciplined—i.e., least 
plasmatic—Japanese forces at the top. The native/animals of the South Seas, con-
versely, are undisciplined but receptive, narratively and pictographically, to 
having discipline imposed. Thus constructed, they are the perfect potential 
colonial subjects. 
Conclusion: Geopolitical Afterlives 
In this article, I have emphasized a certain narrative trajectory common to both 
Songokū and the Momotarō films: that is, geographical expansion outward from the 
Japanese home islands, westward and southward into first China and the Asian 
continent, then into Southeast Asia and the islands of the South Pacific. Though 
the expansion is figured as less explicitly military in Songokū than in Momotarō, it 
is in all cases righteous and divinely-ordained, drawing on a premodern folktale 
for both “historical” precedent and moral justification. Despite this seemingly 
straightforward ideological alignment with Japan’s imperial project, I have argued 
that various aspects of the films put pressure on their capacity to function as 
propaganda: their reception contexts, paratexts, media modes, and perhaps above 
all their ambiguous (and ambivalent) relationships to Western, particularly 
American, cultural signifiers. Sea Eagles, for instance, may be attempting to “over-
come (Western) modernity” by killing a debased Bluto and replacing Popeye’s 
spinach with kibidango, but for this parody to work it requires an audience already 
intimately familiar with the tropes being remixed. The film points to and thus 
implicitly reinforces the hegemony of American mass culture even while trying to 
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undermine it. 
The ending of Divine Soldiers even gestures at a literal, non-symbolic overcom-
ing of America and the “asymmetrical totalizing triad” it supports. In the final 
scene, after the British/Demons have been subdued, the film returns once more 
to the bucolic Japanese hometown setting in which it began. Here we see the 
younger siblings of the heroic seamen engaged in military drills: practicing their 
dropping-and-rolling, racing up ladders, etc. At the very end of the rustic obstacle 
course, the children must perform a leap of faith: from high up in a tree down onto 
the ground, where there is a detailed chalk outline of North America. The little 
monkey brother—the most individuated of the children and the only to get a 
close-up—hesitates, momentarily afraid. But with encouragement from his rabbit 
friend, he screws up his courage, yells, and leaps. Mid-jump, the background din 
of screaming children disappears and is replaced by a sentimental, triumphant 
orchestral piece. The boy falls in slow-motion, smoothly lands and rolls, and then 
stands astride America, monumentalized in low angle. One final shot (also low 
angle) shows the children running off into the horizon, as the camera tilts up to 
incorporate them into the national body, metonymized by Mt. Fuji, the image on 
which the film fades out. 
Obviously, over the course of Divine Soldiers’ three-year production schedule, 
an actual physical invasion of the North American continent by Japanese para-
troopers had gone from wishful thinking to plain absurdity. In May 1945, it was 
the Japanese home islands that were under imminent threat of invasion; any adult 
with the least bit of sense must have viewed this scene with bitter irony. Neverthe-
less, it is worth considering how Divine Soldiers might have been processed by its 
primary audience: the children and especially military recruitment-aged youths 
whose natural “affinity” to animation was a large part of the film’s initial purpose. 
The surface pleasures offered by the film are many; in between the singing animals, 
communal exertions, and thrilling combat, the structures of Japan’s expansionist 
geopolitics must have formed a “natural” backdrop. But would this ideological 
mapping have persisted into the postwar? 
As a matter of fact, we have some evidence that it did. A fifteen-year-old boy 
named Tezuka Osamu saw Divine Soldiers in its original 1945 release, and wrote of 
it: “My first impression of the film was that it seemed to use elements of culture 
films [documentaries], and even though called a war film, it had in fact taken on a 
peaceful form. . . . My next impression was that cartoons had been very beautifully 
cinematized. . . . What is more, the storyline was clearer than anything before it; it 
was more like a documentary than a cartoon” (Ōtsuka 272). Tezuka would of 
course go on to become the most influential and revered manga artist of the 
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postwar period, a figure often referred to as the “god” of manga. Ōtsuka details 
how Tezuka’s own development as a young artist was influenced by the cinematic 
storytelling in Divine Soldiers, starting that same year with his short comic effort 
“Until the Day of Victory.” There is thus a direct historical through line between 
the aesthetics of the Momotarō films and those of the manga/anime industries 
today, collectively valued in excess of $3 billion. Beyond style, though, Tezuka’s 
youthful comments on Divine Soldiers’ “peaceful form” and “documentary” 
qualities hint at a fundamental divide between animation’s content and the expe-
rience of it. Only with animation can a war film be made to feel peaceful and a 
talking animal cartoon made to feel “real.” And so it is in today’s manga and anime, 
where ethnonationalist themes are not only commonly hidden in plain sight but 
indeed exported to the rest of the world, to East Asia and North America in 
particular. The 2012 reboot of influential 70s series Space Battleship Yamato—
named, of course, after the Imperial Navy’s flagship Yamato—offers but one recent 
example. How ironic that Japan’s military expansion failed but the cultural forms 
developed to encourage it persist in the manga/anime complex through which 
“cool Japan” generates much of its global soft power today. 
And Enoken? Certainly, no amount of ideological work sufficed to warm the 
wartime bureaucrats over to Enoken’s side. His appearance in Kurosawa Akira’s 
The Men Who Tread on the Tiger’s Tail is a case in point. The film, produced in the 
closing months of the Pacific War but not finished until the American occupation 
was underway, has the curious distinction of being the only movie censored by the 
Home Ministry after Japan’s surrender. As with so much of Enoken’s 1930s output, 
Tiger’s Tail was a period film based on a Kabuki play (“Kanjichō”), itself based on 
an older Noh play. Apparently, the “act of mockery,” of putting modern comedian 
Enoken into this “traditional” cultural object, was simply too much for the censors 
to bear (Kurosawa 143). When the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers 
(SCAP) compelled the Home Ministry to compile a report on all films awaiting 
release in the industry, the censors deliberately “lost” the file on Tiger’s Tail—
essentially their last act in power. The film was thus rendered “illegal” and unscreen-
able until its discovery and resuscitation years later by the head of the G.H.Q.’s film 
division. Tiger’s Tail finally had its premiere seven years later in April 1952, just 
days before the occupation’s official end. 
But Tiger’s Tail aside, Enoken would go on to enjoy a successful comeback in 
the postwar, appearing in a total of 92 films between late 1945 and 1969, alongside 
many of the era’s typically optimistic, “democratic” stars like Misora Hibari and 
even his old Asakusa theatrical rival, Furukawa Roppa. In 1984, fourteen years 
after his death, a special Kinema Junpo poll ranked him the seventh greatest male 
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Japanese movie star of all time—the only comedian on the list (Izaki 10). Obviously, 
his wartime films did not terribly warp his star image in the eyes of the public; or, 
alternatively, his image proved ripe for postwar “reconstruction,” as did that of so 
many of his peers.18 He is largely remembered in precisely the way he always 
wanted to be remembered: as an “innocent clown,” a person “born loving to make 
everyone laugh” (Enomoto 1940). 
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